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USING THE JULIAN ASSANGE
DISPUTE TO ADDRESS
INTERNATIONAL LAW’S FAILURE TO
ADDRESS THE RIGHT OF DIPLOMATIC
ASYLUM
INTRODUCTION

O

n November 20, 2010, an international arrest warrant
was issued for WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who
was wanted in Sweden for questioning on the charges of rape,
sexual molestation, and unlawful coercion. 1 Less than three
weeks later, on December 8, 2010, Assange turned himself into
the London, United Kingdom police, triggering a lengthy legal
battle that played out in the English courts over the next
eighteen months.2 The case seemingly drew to a conclusion in
May 2012, when the U.K. Supreme Court determined that
Sweden’s “extradition request had been ‘lawfully made.’”3 After
a final bid to reopen his appeal was dismissed, U.K. officials
were given ten days to remove Assange to Sweden.4
Rather than exhaust his legal alternatives by pursuing an
appeal with the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”),5
1. Timeline: Sexual Allegations Against Assange in Sweden, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11949341.
2. After Assange was granted bail in December 2010, both the Magistrates’ Court and the U.K. High Court ruled against him prior to the U.K.
Supreme Court agreeing to review the case. Id.
3. Julian Assange Loses Extradition Appeal at Supreme Court, BBC
NEWS (May 30, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18260914. Although
Assange was not permitted to appeal directly to the U.K. Supreme Court, he
won the right to petition directly to the court after judges ruled that “the case
raised a question of general public importance.” Julian Assange Wins Right to
NEWS
(Dec.
5,
2011),
Pursue
Extradition
Fight,
BBC
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16027942. The U.K. Supreme Court determined that the Swedish prosecutor who issued the European Arrest Warrant
(“EAW”) was a “judicial authority” within the broad meaning provided in the
statutory language. Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2012] UKSC
22 (appeal taken from Eng.).
4. Supreme Court Dismisses Assange Appeal Bid, BBC NEWS (June 14,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18446295.
5. Id. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) is an international
court established by the European Convention on Human Rights that rules
on alleged “violations of the civil and political rights set out in the European
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Assange sought refuge at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London
in June 2012.6 Citing his well-founded fears of political persecution and the possibility of the death penalty were he sent to
the United States,7 Ecuador formally granted asylum to Assange on August 16, 2012.8 Sweden and the U.K. criticized Ecuador’s controversial decision and vowed to prevent Assange from
receiving safe passage out of the country.9

Convention on Human Rights.” The Court in Brief, EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
6. Wikileaks’ Julian Assange Seeks Asylum in Ecuador Embassy, BBC
NEWS (June 20, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18514726.
7. Article 1(A)(2) of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines “refugee” as any person that “owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees [CRSR] art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Organization of American States (“OAS”), of which Ecuador is a member, has formally
recognized the “relevance and fundamental importance of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol, as the principal universal instruments for the protection of refugees.” Organization of
American States [OAS], Protection of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Returnees in the Americas, ¶ 1, Gen. Assemb. Res. 2232, OAS Doc. XXXVI-O/06
(June 6, 2006), compiled in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH REGULAR
SESSION 285, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXXVI-O.2 (Nov. 9, 2006).
8. William Neuman & Maggy Ayala, Ecuador Grants Asylum to Assange,
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2012),
Defying
Britain,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/americas/ecuador-to-let-assangestay-in-its-embassy.html. Asylum is the “[p]rotection of usu. political refugees
from arrest by a foreign jurisdiction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (9th ed.
2009). A refugee is “[a] person who flees or is expelled from a country, esp.
because of persecution, and seeks haven in another country.” Id. at 1394. The
fundamental relation between the two terms is that a refugee seeks to become an asylee by seeking asylum in a foreign state.
9. Julian Assange: Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19281492 [hereinafter
Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum]. In its defense, Ecuador alleged
that numerous offers that would have allowed Swedish officials to question
Assange at the Ecuadorean embassy were denied. Ecuador: Sweden Spurned
TODAY
(Aug.
1,
2012),
Offer
to
Question
Assange,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-01/assange-wikileaksecuador/56669276/1.
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Because Assange took refuge in Ecuador’s diplomatic mission
and not within its formal territory, he was the recipient of the
right of “diplomatic asylum.”10 This distinction is notable not
only because Assange’s freedom of movement is limited, but
also because political asylum and diplomatic asylum draw their
support from different international treaties. In support of its
position, Ecuador primarily relied on two treaties—the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the Organization of American States (“OAS”) Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man—as illustrative of basic human
rights to which every individual is entitled.11 In addition, Ecuador relied on the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum,
which established the principle of diplomatic asylum in Latin
America for instances when these fundamental human rights
were threatened.12 Finally, when the U.K. allegedly threatened
10. The U.N. broadly defined this term in 1975 as “asylum granted by a
State outside its territory, particularly in its diplomatic missions . . . in its
consulates, on board its ships in the territorial waters of another State . . .
and also on board its aircraft and of its military or para-military installations
in foreign territory.” U.N. Secretary-General, Question of Diplomatic Asylum,
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/10139 (Part II) (Sept. 22, 1975) [hereinafter Question of Diplomatic Asylum]. This form is notably different than “territorial asylum” in
that asylum is granted by a nation outside its borders. Id.
11. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, ¶ 14(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). Conversely, Article XXVII of the OAS Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
states that “[e]very person has the right, in case of pursuit not resulting from
ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each country and with international agreements.” OAS,
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 27,
OEA/Ser.L/V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,
OEA/Ser.L.V./11.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 17.
12. The Convention on Diplomatic Asylum is a multilateral treaty ratified
in 1955 that bound many Latin American nations to the rules and regulations surrounding the practice of diplomatic asylum. This convention notably
recognizes “[a]sylum granted in legations to persons being sought for political
reasons or for political offenses,” and defines legations as “any seat of a regular diplomatic mission . . . .” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, art. 1, Mar.
28, 1954, O.A.S.T.S. No. 18, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Although each American nation
is a formal member of the OAS via ratification of the OAS Charter, signatories to the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum are limited to Latin American
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to enter the Ecuadorian embassy and arrest Assange, Ecuador
forbade entry by citing to another international treaty—The
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.13
The U.K. remains steadfast in its desire to extradite Assange
and provided two arguments in stating its opposition to Ecuador’s involvement. 14 First, the U.K. asserted that Ecuador is
under a legal obligation to remove Assange to Sweden after the
U.K. Supreme Court ruled that the European Arrest Warrant
(“EAW”) against him, requiring his arrest and transfer to Sweden for prosecution,15 was enforceable.16 Second, the U.K. refused to recognize “the principle of diplomatic asylum.”17 The
countries. Compare Charter of the Organization of American States: General
Information, DEP’T INT’L LAW, OAS, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States_sign.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2013) (indicating that each American nation had signed the Charter
by 1991), with Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, DEP’T
INT’L LAW, OAS, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-46.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (indicating that membership excluded nations such as the
United States and Canada).
13. Damien Pearse, UK Threatened to Arrest Assange Inside Embassy,
(Aug.
15,
2012),
Says
Ecuadorean
Minister,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/aug/15/uk-arrest-julian-assangewikileaks-ecuador. Article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides: “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents
of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the
head of the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 22(1),
Apr. 4, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
14. Ecuador Grants Wikileaks Founder Asylum, supra note 9.
15. The EAW, adopted in 2002, “is a judicial decision issued by a Member
State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a
requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal persecution or
executing a custodial sentence or detention order.” Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Council
Framework Decision]. Once Sweden (the issuing authority) issued an international arrest warrant for Assange, the system triggered the U.K.’s obligation (as the executing judicial authority) to remove Assange to Sweden, since
both nations are members of the EU. Countries, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm
(last
visited Jan. 18, 2013). The EAW has no binding effect on Ecuador, since it is
not a member of the EU.
16. Assange Loses Extradition Appeal, supra note 3.
17. U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague added that diplomatic asylum
“is far from a universally accepted concept: the United Kingdom is not a party to any legal instruments which require us to recognise the grant of diplo-
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U.K. asserted that even for countries that do accept diplomatic
asylum, it should not be granted “for the purposes of escaping
the regular processes of the courts.”18 The U.K. claimed that
Assange’s legal options had been exhausted by virtue of the
fact that three separate courts in the U.K. ruled that the EAW
was valid. 19 Thus began a lengthy standoff, pitting Ecuador
and the small number of countries that recognize diplomatic
asylum against the U.K. 20 Both sides maintain that international law supports their respective positions.21
When the right of political asylum was definitively recognized
in 1948,22 most nations interpreted the right to cover instances
of asylum granted to an individual by a nation within its borders, or “territorial asylum.”23 However, the lack of clarity of
the scope of territorial asylum has led to significant uncertainty about whether the right extends to individuals seeking
asylee status from a diplomatic mission.24 In 1950, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”), in Asylum Case, indicated that diplomatic asylum was not protected by internation-

matic asylum by a foreign embassy in this country.” Foreign Secretary Statement on Ecuadorian Government’s Decision to Offer Political Asylum to Julian Assange, GOV.UK (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latestnews/?view=News&id=800710782 [hereinafter Foreign Secretary Statement].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Compare Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19314618 (demonstrating regional support for Ecuador’s position), with Hague Says Assange
Rights Protected by Sweden, UK, EU, and International Law, MERCOPRESS
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/09/04/hague-says-assangerights-protected-by-sweden-uk-eu-and-international-law (indicating that diplomatic asylum is not necessary to protect Assange’s human rights).
21. Julian Assange: Ecuador Asylum Decision Criticized, BBC NEWS (Aug.
17, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19292323.
22. See UDHR, supra note 11 (recognizing everybody’s “right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”).
23. Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 1. The U.N. specifically considered the right of territorial asylum when drafting Article 14 of the
UDHR, despite efforts from various Latin American nations to include a provision that would extend this right to diplomatic asylum. Id. ¶ 192.
24. See id. (defining diplomatic asylum as being granted by “a State outside its territory, particularly in its diplomatic missions . . .”).
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al law;25 however, it also intimated that diplomatic asylum may
exist on an international scale as customary law if accepted by
all parties.26 While the use of diplomatic asylum is concededly
prevalent in nations that have explicitly recognized the principle,27 it is the noteworthy instances where diplomatic asylum
has been granted by nations that purportedly do not recognize
the concept28 that demonstrate its largely undefined role within
customary international law. As it currently stands, nations
such as Ecuador work within the margins of international law,
quoting various multilateral treaties that allegedly support
their position at the particular moment when diplomatic asylum is granted.29
This Note argues that the ICJ’s intervention is necessary to
redefine the right of diplomatic asylum and to clarify the protection it is owed under international law. In its current form,
the vague principle of diplomatic asylum is not protected by
international law and should thus be redefined to address
25. See generally Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) (stating
that diplomatic asylum was not protected by international law, but it may
exist as customary law if accepted by all involved parties).
26. Id. at 277–78.
27. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11–12, 155
(“[T]he practice, especially prevalent in Latin American countries, of granting
asylum in legations or embassies . . . had not been accepted by the majority of
European States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular.”).
28. See, e.g., Richard Allen Greene, Assange Embassy Gamble Follows
Famous Precedents, CNN (June 21, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0621/world/world_embassy-defections_1_wikileaks-founder-julian-assangevatican-embassy-ecuador (listing three cases where the United States granted asylum to those who sought refuge in their diplomatic missions).
29. In its official statement granting Assange diplomatic asylum, Ecuador
cited sixteen legal instruments that provided the authority to grant Assange
asylum. See Declaración del Gobierno de la República del Ecuador sobre lo
solicitud de asilo de Julian Assange [Declaration of the Government of the
Republic of Ecuador on the Asylum Application of Julian Assange],
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA [MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HUMAN MOBILITY: ECUADOR] (Aug. 18, 2012),
http://cancilleria.gob.ec/declaracion-del-gobierno-de-la-republica-del-ecuadorsobre-la-solicitud-de-asilo-de-julian-assange/ [hereinafter Declaración del
Gobierno]. Amongst them were the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, the Geneva Convention of 1949, the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id.

2014]

DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM

449

modern concerns.30 An important part of this transformation is
establishing specific guidelines as to how the right of diplomatic asylum will be administered—specifically with regards to its
scope within international law, the requisite conditions for
when it may be granted, and its provisional nature. Such a resolution must also seek to address how the protection of regional
interests is to be reconciled with the promotion of global cooperation.
Part I of this Note provides background information on how
the debate surrounding diplomatic asylum is framed within
instruments of international law. Part II shows how geopolitical differences on whether the right to diplomatic asylum exists
makes resolution of the Assange dispute under the current
standard unlikely, and illustrates why enforcement of diplomatic asylum has been nearly impossible to administer internationally. Part III proposes three solutions—establishing the
scope of diplomatic asylum, outlining specific conditions that
are applied to all individuals requesting diplomatic asylum,
and determining how it would be terminated if no resolution is
reached after a period of time—and discusses how they should
be achieved, consequently defining diplomatic asylum’s role
within international law.
I. BACKGROUND
At its most fundamental level, the Assange case illustrates
the conflicting viewpoints regarding the right of diplomatic asylum and its basis in international law.31 However, the dispute
30. Asylum Case is the lone ruling by the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ” or “Court”) on the legitimacy of diplomatic asylum, and although the
Court refused to recognize diplomatic asylum as a universal legal concept, the
ruling permitted nations to regulate diplomatic asylum on a case-by-case basis. See Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 266. The ICJ advised the parties to resolve
their dispute through negotiation, a resolution that is utilized to this day.
Jovan Kurbalija, The Assange Asylum Case: Possible Solutions and Probable
(Aug.
16,
2012),
Consequences,
DIPLOFOUNDATION
http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/assange-asylum-case-possible-solutions-andprobable-consequences.
31. These conflicting viewpoints are encapsulated in statements made by
Ecuador and the U.K. in the weeks following Assange being granted diplomatic asylum. Ecuador defended its decision to grant diplomatic asylum by
first discussing the potential dangers of extradition and then appealing for
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also demonstrates that the debate surrounding diplomatic asylum often involves case-specific legal issues not directly related
to the right of asylum.32 While the contentious issue of diplomatic asylum in the Assange dispute has received the most international attention, there are too many elements of this particular case for it to be cast only as a “diplomatic asylum”
case.33 The complexity of the diplomatic asylum issue is often
clouded by tensions between regional interests and global
commitments, as is the case when it is allowed to flourish regionally in the name of international human rights. 34 While
these incongruous responsibilities are often limited to a national scale, questions about the legitimacy of diplomatic asy-

international recognition by presenting various international agreements in
support of its position. Id. The U.K.’s response made it clear that it finds itself under no legal obligation to recognize diplomatic asylum by any foreign
embassy. Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17. To the contrary, the
U.K.’s desire to extradite Assange results from a binding legal obligation that
arises from its responsibilities to EU member states under the EAW system.
See Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17; Council Framework Decision,
supra note 15, art. 31(1) (indicating that the EAW “replace[s] the corresponding provisions of the . . . conventions applicable in the field of extradition in
relations between the Member States”).
32. Factors to consider in the context of a diplomatic asylum case may include, but are not limited to: the relationship between the interested nations,
the crime for which the individual is sought, and the length of time for which
the individual has been pursued.
33. The Assange case specifically brings into question the applicability of
diplomatic asylum in cases where an individual faces impending political
persecution and the death penalty, as Ecuador alleges Assange would face if
surrendered to Swedish authorities. Neuman & Ayala, supra note 8. The
EAW system raises separate questions about whether extradition to another
member country is appropriate if the allegations made by the issuing country
do not constitute a crime in the executing country. Although English courts
twice rejected Assange’s specific contention that the allegations would not
have constituted rape in the U.K., the issue remains largely unresolved. David Allen Green, Legal Myths about the Assange Extradition, NEWSTATESMAN
BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allengreen/2012/08/legal-myths-about-assange-extradition.
34. These obligations may be legal or nonlegal. Legal obligations between
nations, such as extradition, are often dictated by treaties and typically have
a limited scope. Nonlegal obligations, such as foreign relations, exist on a
larger scale and often have an indeterminate scope.
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lum result in a difficult analysis when issues of preexisting
commitments between countries arise.35
A. Extradition and the European Arrest Warrant
In a typical diplomatic asylum case, the individual seeking
asylee status often stands accused of crimes perpetrated in the
nation seeking the individual’s apprehension. It stands to reason that the nation seeking apprehension would request cooperation from other nations to assist in the individual’s capture.
In this manner, one legal issue that is not specific to the
Assange dispute is the widely recognized international obligation known as the extradition process.36 The practice of extradition originated in early civilizations, but has seen its scope expand as “[g]lobalization has brought about increased mobility
for persons across national borders, greater opportunities for
transnational crimes, and significantly more knowledge about
international crimes.”37 Despite its increased acceptance, it is
commonly understood that there is no general obligation for a
state to extradite an individual to a foreign government.38
As a result, extradition finds its legal basis almost exclusively
in a vast number of bilateral and multilateral treaties. Most
common law countries require formal treaties with respect to
extradition, including the United States and the U.K.39 As of
October 2011, the United States was a party to 114 bilateral

35. These international obligations may be outlined in near-universally
recognized pieces of international law, such as documents adopted by the
U.N. or multilateral treaties between nations.
36. Extradition is defined as “[t]he official surrender of an alleged criminal
by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 665.
37. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE 34 (4th ed. 2002).
38. An increasing number of states may now be engaged in extradition due
to their perceived “need for increased international cooperation” as a result of
recent international developments such as globalization and terrorism. Id. at
xi–xii. Although one line of thinking holds that an affirmative legal duty does
have a basis in international law, this view is adopted only “with respect to
international crimes.” Id.
39. Id. at 36. Contrary to common law countries, civil law countries typically do not observe formal obligations and instead grant extradition “on the
basis of reciprocity or comity.” Id.
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extradition treaties as well as the Multilateral Convention on
Extradition.40 Though beneficial to a certain extent, the lack of
international uniformity regarding the rules of extradition can
pose significant problems with respect to enforcement and
compliance.41 In addition, a consequence of exclusive reliance
on bilateral extradition treaties is that it necessitates “a burdensome practice of treaty-making.”42 The result of this continuously evolving system of regulation is that the extradition
process is more efficient between “states which have closer political relations and similar legal systems.”43
While some nations have expressed a reluctance to engage in
extradition, based in part on national sovereignty concerns, the
process is generally recognized as necessary to facilitate the
prosecution of both domestic and international crimes.44 Due to
its importance, adherence to the treaties that make up extradition law is the primary means by which nations can enhance
international cooperation.45 The international community supplements this piecemeal approach by imposing an affirmative
40. See 1 WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES, UNITED
STATES v–ix (2011). The United States is also a party to a number of multilateral treaties relating to extradition, namely aviation, genocide, narcotic
drugs, terrorism, and torture. See 2 WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., EXTRADITION
LAWS AND TREATIES, UNITED STATES 1150.1–1150.36 (2011).
41. One benefit to such a structure is “more detailed laws and more effective administration and judicial procedures,” which often result in “a tendency to facilitate extradition.” BASSIOUNI, supra note 37, at xii. The process also
allows nations to condition their compliance on certain issues, such as the
possibility of certain forms of punishment, the political nature of the alleged
crime, and jurisdiction. In this manner, national legislation and specificallytailored extradition treaties provide a legitimate and effective means by
which nations can protect their sovereignty or any other values they believe
are worth protecting within the context of international law.
42. Id. at 86. The lack of uniformity may also mean newcomers to the process are “less forthcoming as well as less effective in their extradition practices,” as well as more reluctant to turn their back on national sovereignty. Id.
at xii.
43. Id. at xii.
44. Bassiouni describes many developing countries as having “a residue of
sensitivity with respect to their national sovereignty,” although he notes that
such concerns are slowly disintegrating. Id. He also notes that the development of the bilateral system was based partly on the preference of developing
nations to emphasize their sovereignty. Id. at 46.
45. Id. at xii.
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legal obligation to extradite individuals alleged to have participated in certain international crimes.46 However, in an effort to
create a more effective and transparent system on a smaller
scale, some regions have undertaken to improve the extradition
process by effectively replacing the treaty-based system with a
system based on more explicit legal obligations.47
A notable instance of a region that has made extraordinary
efforts to supplement bilateral treaties on extradition and improve coordination between member states is the European
Union.48 Prior to 2001, the EU had a treaty on extradition in
place that exceeded what was required of it under international
law.49 Despite this, the EU felt increasing pressure to improve
cooperation between member states following the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11,
2001.50 The primary result of the EU’s renewed interest was
the adoption of the EAW in 2002, which replaced the extradition system in place at the time. 51 The principle of “mutual
recognition,” which allows for the harmonization between the
46. Bassiouni lists twenty types of multilateral conventions that establish
the duty to extradite, including, but not limited to war, apartheid, torture,
slavery, and genocide. Id. at 913–24.
47. Multilateral Regional Arrangements are often the by-products of such
efforts and serve as “a mechanism to harmonize legal systems, if not unify
them with respect to the practice.” Id. at 42.
48. These efforts are possibly the result of the EU’s desire “to harmonize
policies among its members in the area of ‘justice and home affairs.’” KRISTIN
ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RS22030, U.S.-EU
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM 1 (Apr. 22, 2013).
49. The European Convention on Extradition was a multilateral treaty
instituted in 1960 between member states that intended to regulate extradition by creating affirmative legal obligations between nations for certain
crimes. Council of Europe, European Convention on Extradition, opened for
signature Dec. 13, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24.
50. This concern was based partly on the fact that “at the time of the 2001
attacks, most EU member states lacked anti-terrorist legislation, or even a
legal definition of terrorism.” ARCHICK, supra note 48. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the EU had “largely open borders and . . . different
legal systems [which] enabled some terrorists and other criminals to move
around easily and evade arrest and prosecution.” Id.
51. Article 31(1) provides that “this Framework Decision shall . . . replace
the corresponding provisions of the . . . conventions applicable in the field of
extradition in relations between the Member States.” Council Framework
Decision, supra note 15, art. 31(1).
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member states in the absence of national legislation,52 was also
introduced to the new legislation. 53 Expansion of this widely
observed economic principle into transnational criminal law,
along with the undeniable purpose of the decision to both harmonize and expand extradition obligations through the EAW,
demonstrates that national sovereignty has taken a back seat
to “police and judicial cooperation” between member states.54
B. Instruments of International Law
While the EAW provides useful guidelines on extradition for
EU member states, its scope is limited by international law.55
The EU has authority over its member states, but each member state also has responsibilities as a result of their membership in the U.N.56 For the instances in which conflicting obligations exist, the U.N. Charter states that responsibilities to the
U.N. shall take precedence over “any other international
52. Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament—Mutual Recognition in the Context of the Follow-up to the Action Plan
for the Single Market, at 3, COM (1999) 299 final (June 16, 1999).
53. “Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the
basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of the framework decision.” Council Framework Decision, supra note
15, art. 1(2) (emphasis added). The EU described the new system as “the first
concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle of
mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation.” Id. ¶ 6.
54. Although the EU describes itself as “a unique economic and political
partnership . . . ,” Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (last visited Jan.
18, 2013), this cooperation in the legal arena falls under the broad “justice
and home affairs” umbrella, which encompasses various policies that are neither political nor economic. ARCHICK, supra note 48.
55. Article 21 is specifically entitled “Competing international obligations,”
and outlines the responsibilities of nations in various circumstances where
this issue may arise. Id. art. 21.
56. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty,
was signed by the members of the former European Community and formally
created the EU. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. This treaty has since been amended to reflect both the
increased role of the EU and its new membership. Treaty of Maastricht on
European Union, EUROPA: SUMMARIES OF LEGISLATION (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_
maastricht_en.htm.
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agreement.”57 The U.N. lays out clearly defined consequences
for violating this supremacy, emphasizing the importance of its
involvement in resolving diplomatic asylum disputes.58 However, issues of supremacy arise in instances where multilateral
agreements that potentially conflict with other international
treaties cause nations to disagree about the extent of their responsibilities under international law. With regard to the U.N.
specifically, various international agreements continue to have
a noteworthy impact on the treatment of refugees and asylees,
especially those residing in diplomatic premises.
Assange’s indefinite stay in the Ecuadorian diplomatic premises creates a significant hurdle for any party attempting to
capture him against his will. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations places significant limitations on the ability of
the U.K. to honor the EAW issued by Sweden. It is a fundamental premise of diplomatic law that “[t]he premises of the
mission shall be inviolable[] [and that] [t]he agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of
the head of the mission.”59 Although Assange has taken refuge
inside a place that is physically accessible to the relevant authorities, the U.K. is left with no means of apprehending
Assange until he leaves the embassy.60 Failure to observe this
clearly-defined limitation would have a drastic effect on the relationship between the U.K. and Ecuador and on diplomatic
relations around the world.61 Therefore, international law of57. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (obligations under the U.N. Charter prevail
over “obligations under any other international agreement”); Council Framework Decision, supra note 15, art. 21.
58. See U.N. Charter art. 6 (“A member of the United Nations which has
persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be
expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”).
59. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13, art. 22.
60. The U.K. has gone so far as to allegedly bring into question the inviolability of the Ecuadorian embassy in London, but eventually retreated from
this position. Pearse, supra note 13.
61. Although the relationship between Ecuador and the U.K. may be irretrievably broken based on the threats exchanged between the countries, Ecuador is currently the sole recipient of the lucrative Andean Trade Preferences from the United States, which provide preferential tariff treatment for
certain products. Nicholas Kozloff, Ecuador Comes Out Winner as UK Overreaches with Assange Threats on Likely Behalf of US, BUZZFLASH (Aug. 19,
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fers near limitless protection to Assange as long as he stays
within Ecuador’s embassy.62
Ecuador’s status as a member of the OAS poses another problem for the U.K., one that was first recognized by the U.N. in
1975.63 The root of diplomatic asylum is traced back to Europe
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when ambassadors
in newly-designated permanent missions were provided with
inviolability of their dwellings to supplement “the personal inviolability that he had traditionally enjoyed in order to remove
him from the influence of the receiving State.”64 However, by
the time the principle had all but disappeared in nineteenth
century Europe, it had been earnestly adopted and frequently
utilized in Latin American countries.65 Following the ratification of the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum by Latin
American countries in 1954, some scholars even went so far as
to argue that the UDHR provided that diplomatic asylum is a
human right. 66 Although the U.N. report on the Question of
Diplomatic Asylum was published more than forty years ago,

2012), http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/item/11685-ecuadorcomes-out-winner-as-uk-overreaches-with-assange-threats-on-likely-behalfof-us. Ecuador may find its trade benefits terminated or reduced when the
preferences go up for renewal, as its preferential status was already unsettled as the result of another dispute that put pressure on relations between
Ecuador and the U.K. As some commentators have noted, Ecuador’s role in
the Assange affair “was not ‘a move destined to win many new friends in
Washington.’” Id.
62. The Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act does offer a legal basis for
withdrawing recognition of diplomatic status under certain circumstances.
Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act, 1987, c. 46, § 1(3), (Eng.). However,
withdrawing such a status must be “permissible under international law,” a
highly disputed proposition that does not unequivocally support the U.K.’s
position. Id. § 1(4).
63. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing
the history and growth of diplomatic asylum, most notably in Latin America).
64. Id. ¶ 2. Shortly thereafter, “ambassadors acquired the habit of receiving persons sought by the authorities of the territorial State.” Id.
65. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The report indicated that many Latin American nations
gained independence around this time, and the growth of diplomatic asylum
likely came as a natural result. Id. ¶ 11.
66. Id. ¶ 297.
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the reality that diplomatic asylum is viewed differently in Latin America than it is internationally has not changed.67
International law stands at the heart of these dissonant
views on diplomatic asylum. The supremacy of the U.N. as an
organization, the scope and binding nature of its various
agreements, and its vast membership make the U.N. the only
international body that can decisively determine whether the
granting of diplomatic asylum was appropriate in the case of
Julian Assange.68 While there are ultimately a number of different manners by which the U.N. could address the issue, the
ICJ, as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” 69 is
the most appropriate body to resolve such a dispute.
C. The Influence of the International Court of Justice
The importance of the ICJ’s role in resolving diplomatic asylum disputes is based on two important factors. First, the
Court’s self-defined role is specifically tailored to hear the dispute between Ecuador and the U.K.70 Individuals are not permitted to appear in front of the Court as “[o]nly States may be

67. See Jovan Kurbalija, Frequently Asked Questions about Diplomatic
(Aug.
20,
2012),
Asylum,
DIPLOFOUNDATION
http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-diplomaticasylum (“While it is not globally accepted as a legal concept, diplomatic asylum exists as regional law in Latin America”); Julian Assange Row: Ecuador
Backed by South America, supra note 20.
68. Of the sixteen legal instruments Ecuador provided as the basis for
granting Assange asylum, five of them were either U.N. documents or required U.N. enforcement. Declaración del Gobierno, supra note 29. These are
the U.N. Charter, UDHR, Geneva Convention, CRSR, and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id.
69. U.N. Charter art. 92.
70. The Court has broad jurisdiction over “all legal disputes concerning: a.
the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; the existence of any fact which . . . would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the . . . reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. The Court is
also able to “give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations to make such a request.” Id. art. 65(1).
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parties in cases before the Court.”71 Further, these states must
be a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.72
Most importantly, the judgments of the Court are binding on
all concerned parties, final, and non-appealable. 73 The strict
guidelines of the ICJ provide the ideal forum to not only resolve
the Assange dispute, but to also examine the validity of diplomatic asylum in general.74 The four other principle organs are
ill-equipped to resolve disputes on international law because
such disputes fall outside their intended responsibilities and
are thus not intended to resolve conflicts of this magnitude.75
71. Id. art. 34(1). This procedural exclusivity ensures that the Court hears
only those cases deemed sufficiently important for sovereign governments to
pursue, and not those pertaining to private parties. In this respect, the ICJ is
unique from each of the other three international courts (European Court of
Justice, ECHR, and Inter-American Court of Human Rights), which are able
to consider claims brought by individuals. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L
COURT
OF
JUSTICE
(ICJ),
http://www.icjcij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). Further, the Court is not permitted to “deal with a dispute of its motion” and
“can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States.” Id.
72. See U.N. Charter art. 93 (indicating that “[a]ll members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,” but also providing non-U.N. members with a means by which they can
become a party to the ICJ Statute).
73. “The judgment is final and without appeal.” ICJ Statute, supra note
70, art. 60. “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party.” U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. Failure to conform to the obligations
required by an ICJ judgment may result in further measures taken by the
U.N. Security Council against the offending country to the extent necessary
to effectuate the judgment. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
74. Ecuador has vowed to “pursue every legal means to bring Assange to
Ecuador,” and acknowledged that an appeal to the ICJ would be considered
as a last resort. Ecuador May File Appeal to ICJ If UK Refuses Assange Safe
Passage, RUS. TODAY (Aug. 19, 2012), http://rt.com/news/ecuador-icc-assangeasylum-942/.
75. The U.N.’s responsibilities are divided amongst five principal organs:
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic & Social Council,
the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. U.N. Charter art. 7,
para 1. The sixth organ listed in the Charter, a Trusteeship Council, “suspended operation on 1 November 1994, with the independence of Palau, the
last remaining United Nations trust territory,” and now meets only “as occasion
require[s].”
Trusteeship
Council,
U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
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Further, the ICJ is the only body that is capable of rectifying
the uncertainty following its ruling in Asylum Case, the last
instance in which it heard a case regarding diplomatic asylum.76 Asylum Case, the first ruling on the Haya de la Torre
dispute,77 involved a Peruvian national who was granted diplomatic asylum in the Colombian embassy in Lima, Peru, after
a warrant was issued for his arrest by the Peruvian government.78 When Peru refused Colombia’s request to allow Haya
de la Torre safe passage into Colombia, Colombia brought suit
against Peru in the ICJ.79 Colombia invoked “American international law in general” and “regional or local custom peculiar
to Latin-American States” to argue that Haya de la Torre was a
proper recipient of diplomatic asylum.80 In response, Peru argued that Colombia’s decision to grant asylum was in violation
of multiple articles of the Havana Convention on Asylum, and
The secretariat is primarily responsible for carrying out the daily tasks of the
U.N. and servicing the other principal organs. It is not designed to effectuate
a resolution based on analysis of international law. See U.N. Charter arts.
97–101. The Economic and Social Council is responsible for “international
economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters,” and is ill
equipped to resolve a dispute with significant political ramifications. Id. art.
62, para. 1. The Security Council is conferred the “primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security,” id. art. 24, para. 1, but
the standoff between the parties appears to be limited to political posturing
and threats. The General Assembly (“G.A.”) has broad discretion to consider
“any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present
Charter.” Id. art. 10.
76. The only sources that have addressed (or notably failed to address) the
concept of diplomatic asylum have been the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (where it was not included despite efforts by Latin American countries), Asylum Case, and the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum.
Kurbalija, supra note 67.
77. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
78. Haya de la Torre was a controversial figure throughout Latin America
based on his political involvement fighting for democracy and labor rights.
Victor Raùl Haya de la Torre, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (“UNHCR”),
http://www.unhcr.org/3b72551038.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
79. Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 272–73.
80. Id. at 270, 276. Colombia argued that as a result of this customary law,
Peru was bound “to give ‘the guarantees necessary for the departure of the
refugee, with due regard to the inviolability of his person, from the country.’”
Id. at 268.
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that Colombia had no right to grant asylum to Haya de la Torre
as a means of avoiding Peru’s laws.81 To resolve the dispute,
the Court had to determine whether Colombia was “competent
to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru.”82
To determine the binding nature of Colombia’s decision to
grant Haya de la Torre diplomatic asylum, the Court applied
the rule that conduct that has been established as custom in a
country is considered binding law in that country.83 The Court
first determined that Colombia had not proven that the rule of
diplomatic asylum had a binding effect on Peru.84 The Court
considered “a large number of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected,” 85 but held
such evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that the custom
existed in Latin America.86 It found that even if custom were
proven in Colombia, it would also have to exist in Peru to have
a binding effect on both parties, and this was not the case.87
The Court next posited that, although “asylum may be granted on humanitarian grounds in order to protect political offenders against the violent and disorderly action of irresponsible sections of the population,” this issue was not in dispute

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 277.
Id.

The facts . . . disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so
much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there
has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum . . . and the practice has been so much influenced by
considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is
not possible to discern in al1 this any constant and uniform usage,
accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.
Id.
87. Id. at 277–78. The Court demonstrated that Peru had actively avoided
adopting diplomatic asylum as custom by virtue of not ratifying two Montevideo Conventions. Id. at 278.
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between the parties.88 The ICJ then considered the confining
language of the Havana Convention to hold that “asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice.”89 The Court elaborated by stating “the safety which arises out of asylum cannot
be construed as a protection against the regular application of
the laws and against the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals.”90 In adding that such vast protection “would . . . become the equivalent of an immunity,”91 the Court’s final disposition gives a clear indication that diplomatic asylum is not
recognized by international law.92 However, the ICJ also recognized that diplomatic asylum in Latin America was “an institution which . . . owes its development to extra-legal factors” and
could continue to exist in customary international law via
“agreements between interested governments inspired by mutual feelings of toleration and goodwill.”93
The impact of the ICJ’s open invitation to engage in diplomatic asylum within the context of customary law was felt immediately. On June 13, 1951, the ICJ made a second ruling on
the Haya de la Torre matter, the Haya de la Torre Case.94 The
Court ruled that, although the asylum granted to Haya de la
Torre should have been terminated, “Colombia [was] under no
obligation to surrender Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre to the Pe-

88. Id. at 282–83. The Court later discounted the possibility that the term
“urgent cases” was intended to encompass “the danger of regular prosecution
to which the citizens of any country lay themselves open by attacking the
institutions of that country.” Id. at 284.
89. Id. at 284. The Court specifically cited Article 2, paragraph 2 of the
Havana Convention, which provided that “[a]sylum may not be granted except in urgent cases and for the period of time strictly indispensable for the
person who has sought asylum to ensure some way his safety.” Id. at 282.
This was taken in conjunction with Article I, paragraph 1, which provided
that states could not grant asylum “to persons accused or condemned for
common crimes . . .” Id. at 281.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 286. The ICJ specifically struggled to find where diplomatic
asylum found its legal basis, as “considerations of convenience or simple political expediency seem to have led the territorial State to recognize asylum
without that decision being dictated by any feeling of legal obligation.” Id.
93. Id.
94. Haya de la Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 71 (June 13).
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ruvian authorities.”95 Less than three years after this ruling, in
1954, several American countries adopted the OAS Convention
on Diplomatic Asylum—fourteen countries would eventually
ratify the agreement.96 In 1961, many Latin American nations
made a strong push for the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations to recognize diplomatic asylum, but were forced to
settle for limited recognition under Article 41(3).97 The general
recognition of diplomatic asylum remains unique to Latin
America.98 Likely as a result of Ecuador’s membership amongst
this small group of signatories to the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, The Union of South American Nations has
pledged its support for Ecuador’s decision to grant asylum to
Assange.99
D. The United States: Paying Attention, but from a Distance
The United States has publicly voiced support for the U.K.,
asserting that it “does not recognize the concept of diplomatic
asylum as a matter of international law.”100 The United States’
95. Id. at 83. The Court added “there is no contradiction between these two
findings,” and encouraged the parties to seek “a practical and satisfactory
solution by seeking guidance from those considerations of courtesy and goodneighborliness. . . .” Id. at 82, 83.
96. Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra note 12.
Because diplomatic asylum was technically administered on an ad hoc basis
following the Haya de la Torre case, a system between Latin American nations developed over the years without regulation or interference by an international body. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10
(discussing the immense growth of diplomatic asylum in Latin America and
whether it has a place within international law).
97. Kurbalija, supra note 67. Article 41(3) of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he premises of the
mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of
the missions as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreement in force between the sending and the receiving State.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
supra note 13, art. 41(3).
98. Matthew Happold, Julian Assange and Diplomatic Asylum, EUR. J.
INT’L L. BLOG (June 24, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/julian-assange-anddiplomatic-asylum/.
99. Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America, supra note
20.
100. Wikileaks: US Dismisses Calls for “Diplomatic Asylum” for Julian
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
17,
2012),
Assange,
DAILY
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role in the process is notable, as both its longstanding interest
in Assange and its use of the death penalty for espionage are
well known.101 The apparent willingness of the United States to
grant diplomatic asylum under rare circumstances frames both
sides of the conflict in a distinct manner because Ecuador is
able to use these instances to support its argument that diplomatic asylum has been recognized as customary law outside
Latin America for many years.102
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASSANGE
DISPUTE
There are countless features of the Assange case that have
lent themselves to scrutiny by the international community.
One of the primary reasons for this scrutiny is that Julian

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/9484176/WikileaksUS-dismisses-calls-for-diplomatic-asylum-for-Julian-Assange.html. In an
interesting historical note, perhaps one of the most famous cases of diplomatic asylum was that of Cardinal József Mindszenty, a Hungarian who sought
refuge from Hungary’s communist government at the U.S. embassy in Budapest in 1956. Martin Austermuhle, Refuge or Refusal: How Easy Is It to Get
Asylum at U.S. Missions? WASH. DIPLOMAT (May 31, 2012),
http://173.201.242.50/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8351:
refuge-or-refusal-how-easy-is-it-to-get-asylum-at-usmissions&catid=1488:june-2012&Itemid=500. After he was granted asylum,
Mindszenty spent the next fifteen years in the U.S. embassy before he was
permitted to leave in 1971. Id.
101. The U.S. Justice Department has launched a criminal investigation
into Assange and Wikileaks regarding the release of classified information
Wikileaks allegedly received from American soldier Bradley Manning. Details of the investigation were requested by Assange’s attorneys to determine
the nature of the allegations. Kevin Gosztola, Lawyers for Julian Assange &
WikiLeaks Seek Details on Justice Department’s Criminal Investigation,
(Oct.
11,
2012),
FIREDOGLAKE
http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2012/10/11/lawyers-for-julian-assangewikileaks-seek-details-on-justice-departments-criminal-investigation/. For its
part, Sweden has stated that Assange will not be extradited if he were to face
the death penalty in the United States. Adam Taylor, Sweden Says It Will
Not Extradite Assange to US If He Faces Death Penalty, BUS. INSIDER (Aug.
21, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/sweden-says-it-will-not-extraditeassange-to-us-if-he-faces-death-penalty-2012-8.
102. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 28 (listing key international precedents
for diplomatic asylum).
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Assange is a well-respected journalist.103 In his position as the
editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, Assange has achieved notable international recognition for his role in disseminating information not otherwise available to the public.104 As a result of
his efforts to create greater transparency in the media and expose numerous human rights transgressions, he has become
something of an international celebrity, albeit under unusual
circumstances.105
103. Amongst the awards Assange has received in recent years are: the
2009 Amnesty International UK Media Award (New Media), Amnesty International Media Awards 2009: Full List of Winners, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/jun/03/amnesty-international-mediaawards; the 2011 Sydney Peace Foundation’s gold medal for his “exceptional
courage in pursuit of human rights,” Julian Assange Awarded Australian
(May
11,
2011),
Peace
Prize,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/julian-assange-australianpeace-prize-wikileaks; the 2011 Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism for his
work that “penetrated the established version of events and . . . expose[d]
established propaganda,” Julian Assange Wins Martha Gellhorn Journalism
(June
2,
2011),
Prize,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/02/julian-assange-marthagelhorn-prize; and the 2011 Walkley Award for Most Outstanding Contribution to Journalism for taking “a brave, determined and independent stand for
freedom of speech and transparency that has empowered people all over the
FOUND.,
world.”
2011
Walkley
Award
Winners,
WALKLEY
http://www.walkleys.com/2011winners#most-outstanding-contribution-tojournalism (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
104. Wikileaks achieves its goal of “bring[ing] important news and information to the public” by “provid[ing] an innovative, secure and anonymous
way for sources to leak information to our journalists.” About: What Is Wikileaks, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2013). Amongst the stories the website has broken about the United States
are classified U.S. reports on the war in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay’s main
operations manuals. Id.
105. A number of high-profile supporters of Assange have forfeited
£300,000, which was offered as sureties and securities after Assange skipped
bail. Celebrity Backers Are £300,000 Down But Still Supporting Assange Despite His Decision to Skip Bail, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2215373/Celebrity-backers-300-000supporting-Assange-despite-decision-skip-bail.html. Michael Moore, Oliver
Stone, and Noam Chomsky are three of the many “celebrities” who signed a
letter to President Correa on June 25, 2012, urging him to grant asylum to
Assange. Moore, Glover, Stone, Maher, Greenwald, Wolf, Ellsberg Urge Correa to Grant Asylum to Assange, JUSTFOREIGNPOLICY.ORG (June 22, 2012),
http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/1257.
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From a legal perspective, however, the convergence of interests in the Assange dispute is perhaps the most alluring. At the
heart of the conflict is Ecuador, a country that has chosen to
protect Assange’s “human rights” while its president, Rafael
Correa, continues to suppress freedom of speech and press
within Ecuador. 106 The Ecuadorian government’s seemingly
contradictory positions have led some to question whether Ecuador’s instrumental role in the process is the result of its legitimate human rights concerns, or President Correa making a
calculated political gamble.107 On the other side of the dispute
is the U.K., which is now faced with the daunting task of monitoring Assange’s every move in the Ecuadorian embassy in order to uphold its duty to execute the EAW.108
Three other parties have a vested interest in the case for distinctly different reasons: Sweden, the United States, and Australia. The root of the conflict is Assange’s alleged misconduct
in Sweden, which finds itself at the center of controversy as to
whether they have their own ulterior motives for Assange de-

106. “Research by numerous international human rights defenders . . . has
concluded that the Correa administration does not brook dissent and is engaged in a campaign to silence its critics in the media.” Carlos Lauría, As It
Backs Assange, Ecuador Stifles Expression at Home, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (Aug. 16, 2012), http://cpj.org/blog/2012/08/as-it-backs-assangeecuador-represses-free-express.php. In his defense, President Correa has
stated that his approach “was necessary to rein in private [media] who had
enjoyed too much power for too long.” Jonathan Watts, Rafael Correa Hits
Back over Ecuador’s Press Freedom and Charge of Hypocrisy, GUARDIAN (Aug.
24,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/24/rafael-correaassange-ecuador-press.
107. One prevailing thought is that Ecuador’s position is largely motivated
by President Correa’s desire “to settle old scores” with the United States, as
well as to “display his political prowess in the run-up to the Ecuadorian presidential elections next year.” Anita Isaacs, It’s Not about Assange, Op-Ed.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/opinion/whycorrea-lets-assange-stay-in-ecuador-embassy.html.
108. “Scotland Yard confirmed it costs £11,000 day to ensure the Australian
does not flee . . . the Ecuadorean Embassy.” Chris Greenwood, Police Stakeout Bill for Assange Tops £11,000 a DAY to Ensure He Doesn’t Flee EcuadoriMAIL
(Oct.
1,
2012),
an
Embassy,
DAILY
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2211530/Police-stakeout-Assangetops-1m-costs-11-000-DAY-ensure-doesnt-flee-Ecuadorian-Embassy.html.
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spite their guarantees to the contrary. 109 Next, despite the
United States’ compelling interest in how the Assange case is
handled, the country appears content to leave “Assange’s immediate fate . . . in the hands of Britain, Sweden, and Ecuador.”110 Finally, despite Australia’s status as Assange’s birthplace, it has conspicuously distanced itself from the Assange
controversy, prompting some citizens and politicians to wonder
why Ecuador was willing to protect Assange when his own government was not.111
The international attention given to the Assange standoff has
served to force Ecuador’s hand.112 The scrutiny has compelled
Ecuador to defend its position vociferously on an international
stage, an undoubtedly different strategy than that which is
typically utilized when diplomatic asylum is granted amongst
Latin American nations. For example, the case would likely receive little attention if Assange sought refuge at an Ecuadorean
embassy located in a nation that had ratified the OAS Conven-

109. See Taylor, supra note 101. Deputy Director of the Service for Criminal
Cases and International Cooperation of Sweden’s Justice Ministry, Cecelia
Riddselius, stated that Sweden “will never surrender a person to the death
penalty.” Id.
110. Mark Hosenball, Julian Assange, Wikileaks Founder, Faces No Criminal Charges in U.S., Sources Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/22/julian-assange-wikileaks-nocriminal-charges-in-us_n_1823159.html (“[S]ources say the United States has
issued no criminal charges against [Assange] and has launched no attempt to
extradite him [to the Unites States].”); Philip Dorling, US Calls Assange ‘En27,
2012),
emy
of
State’,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept.
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/us-calls-assange-enemy-ofstate-20120927-26m7s.html. It was reported on September 27, 2012, that
Assange and Wikileaks were “designated as enemies of the United States,” a
designation which “ha[s] serious implications for [Assange] if he were to be
extradited to the U.S.” Id.
111. Monica Attard, Ecuador Gives Assange Asylum, but for Australia
‘Nothing
Has
Changed’,
CNN
(Aug.
17,
2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/asia/australia-assange-asylumecuador/index.html.
112. Ecuador insinuated that the attention being given to Assange is not
only the result of “persecution in different countries [as a result of exposing]
corruption and severe human rights abuses of citizens around the world,” but
also the desire of various nations to cater to the desires of the United States.
Declaración del Gobierno, supra note 29.
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tion on Diplomatic Asylum.113 However, the U.K. is not a party
to that convention and it does not otherwise recognize the concept of diplomatic asylum.114 Therefore, the protection available
to Ecuador if asylum were granted in another Latin American
country does not apply.115
Ecuador, aware of its dilemma, looked for guidance from an
international organization in which membership is nearly universal: the U.N.116 Since diplomatic asylum was not formally
recognized at the 1961 Vienna Convention,117 Ecuador supported its position by demonstrating that political asylum was a
universally recognized principle118 and by citing to the inviolability of the diplomatic mission.119 In demonstrating universal
recognition of two separate concepts that, taken together, offer
some support for diplomatic asylum, Ecuador established that
Assange is safe from extradition while he remains in its em-

113. See Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra
note 12 (indicating that membership consists exclusively of Latin American
nations).
114. Foreign Secretary Statement, supra note 17. See also Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶¶ 155–56 (proposing to the Internal Law
Commission “that the words ‘in its territory’ should be added after the word
‘asylum’” because “that practice had not been accepted by the majority of European States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular”).
115. Id. Of the legal documents that Ecuador cites as support for its position, some are binding on the U.K. and some are not. See Declaración del Gobierno, supra note 29.
116. See Press Release, Dept. of Pub. Info., United Nations Member States,
U.N. Press Release ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006) (listing the 192 member states
after Montenegro was admitted on June 28, 2006).
117. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is the treaty that regulates diplomatic relations between countries; it notably excludes any language that would have recognized the concept of diplomatic asylum. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13, art. 41(3).
118. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27
of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Geneva Convention provide the most relevant support on this issue. See sources cited supra
note 11; see generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (although this
document does not explicitly reference the right of asylum, the articles discuss at length the rights of parties taken as prisoners during international
conflicts, whose status may eventually become that of an asylee).
119. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 13.
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bassy.120 In addition, Ecuador has put the onus on Sweden to
guarantee that Assange will not face subsequent extraditions
to a “third country . . . that would put at risk Mr. Assange’s life
and freedom.”121 However, up to this point, all appearances are
that Ecuador has found Sweden’s response unsatisfactory in
that it has not been able to guarantee Assange will not face extradition to a third country.122
The problems demonstrated by the Assange case are illustrative of the lack of regulation surrounding diplomatic asylum
that has existed on an international scale for more than a century.123 On one hand, widespread recognition of diplomatic asylum has been limited to Latin America since the nineteenth
century.124 In theory, Latin American nations are able to grant
diplomatic asylum freely amongst other parties to the OAS

120. See Ecuador President Correa Wants ‘Guarantee’ Over Assange, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19309183. Given the
fact that Assange’s stay has extended to seven months, with no sign of an
impending resolution, the U.K. appears resigned to the protection afforded to
Assange within the embassy. Meanwhile, Assange has also realized his
unique status and continues to make “public appearances” from the embassy.
See Alexander Rankine, Oxford Students to Protest at Assange ‘Visit,’
(Jan.
10,
2013),
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2013/jan/10/oxford-students-to-protestat-assange-talk.
121. Ecuador President Correa Wants ‘Guarantee’ over Assange, supra note
120.
122. Although Deputy Director of the Service for Criminal Cases and International Cooperation of Sweden’s Justice Ministry, Cecelia Riddselius, has
stated “that they would demand strict assurances from the US that ‘the prisoner will not be executed in any case,’” she admitted that it was impossible to
guarantee whether Assange would be extradited without a formal extradition
request. Taylor, supra note 101.
123. This lack of regulation is likely the result of an international community that has failed to recognize the problems that accompany widespread use.
Despite the issues discussed in detail in the U.N. Secretary-General report,
no significant steps were taken by the U.N. to clarify the right of asylum established in numerous agreements. See supra note 63. A 1967 protocol made
small changes to diplomatic asylum, specifically with regards to temporal and
geographic limitations, but it did not take the opportunity to redefine the
right of asylum generally. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
124. See supra note 65.
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Convention on Diplomatic Asylum.125 On the other hand, because diplomatic asylum draws numerous fundamental similarities to political asylum, countries such as Ecuador are able
to support their arguments on an international scale with numerous universally recognized documents that non-OAS parties are unable or unwilling to challenge.126 It is not in the best
interests of the U.K. and the United States, long-standing and
integral members of the U.N., to challenge treaties that have
been in force for decades and are of fundamental importance to
the development of human rights.127
Foreign-relations law introduces another complication in addressing diplomatic asylum. 128 Each party involved in the
Assange case occupies a unique role within the controversy.
Ecuador’s position on asylum has been widely criticized, but
regional support appears to have strengthened the country’s
resolve. 129 Ecuador now appears fully prepared to let the

125. Although exact figures are unavailable, there is evidence that Latin
American nations have granted diplomatic asylum on a frequent basis since
it became prevalent in the nineteenth century. The U.N. report lists seven
instances over a period of forty-one years when diplomatic asylum was granted, and acknowledges that the “list is purely illustrative” of “[m]any other
examples . . . mentioned in the records in the asylum case and in various publications.” Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12. The ICJ
acknowledged that the “Colombian Government has referred to a large number of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and
respected.” Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
126. See, e.g., supra note 29.
127. Not only were the U.K. and the United States members of the U.N.
when the Charter was ratified in 1945, but both nations have maintained
permanent membership status on the U.N. Security Council since that time.
U.N. Charter art. 110; U.N. Charter art. 23.
128. The term “foreign-relations law” has come to encompass the modern
definition of “international law,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at
720, which is defined as “the law of international relations, embracing not
only nations but also such participants as international organizations and
individuals (such as those who invoke their human rights or commit war
crimes).” Id. at 892.
129. Although the ministers pledged their general support for Ecuador, they
have also taken a diplomatic stance on the dispute, urging that both parties
“continue the dialogue and negotiation to find a mutually acceptable solution.” Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by South America, supra note 20;
see discussion supra Part II.
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Assange situation run its course.130 Although Sweden’s interest
in questioning a man who allegedly committed crimes of a sexual nature has not been challenged, speculation is rampant as
to whether Sweden is a conduit for the United States to gain
possession of Assange to try him in the U.S. legal system.131
Even if a party were to disregard the potential risks that accompany drastic measures against Ecuador, each nation must
also consider the risks of going against the Latin American nations that have pledged their support for Ecuador.132
Smaller regional international organizations, such as the
OAS, further strain the balance between the protection of regional interests and the promotion of global cooperation.133 Up
to this point, Ecuador’s membership in the OAS has caused
manifest problems because of the tacit support Ecuador has
received from other OAS members as well as the legal basis the

130. Ecuador has stated that Assange could remain inside its embassy for
“two centuries” if necessary. Luke Harding, Julian Assange Can Stay in Embassy for ‘Centuries’, Says Ecuador, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/aug/23/julian-assange-ecuadorembassy.
131. Some believe Sweden’s continued role has been dictated by the fact
that it is easier for the United States to extradite Assange from Sweden than
it would be from the U.K., although in reality this may be more difficult.
Green, supra note 33. The United States and Sweden have enjoyed a strong
relationship over the years, as evidenced by their military cooperation during
the Cold War. Peter Vinthagen Simpson, Research Reveals Depth of Sweden(Mar.
17,
2009),
US
Cold
War
Relations,
LOCAL
http://www.thelocal.se/18262/20090317/#.UPLzW6HjlH8.
132. The U.K. has sought to improve its trade relations with Latin America
in recent years, an effort that may be severely hampered as a result of its
declining reputation in the region. Julian Assange Row: Ecuador Backed by
South America, supra note 20.
133. The OAS is the “world’s oldest regional organization,” which dates
back to the First International Conference of American States in 1890. The
First International Conference of American States also established “the interAmerican system, the oldest international institutional system.” Who We Are,
OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Jan. 19,
2013). It was created “to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.” Charter of the
Organization of American States art. 1, para. 1, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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binding regional treaties under the OAS provide.134 However,
membership to the OAS should not affect Ecuador’s responsibilities to the U.N.135 The OAS exists as a regional agency within the U.N. and provides that one of the principal responsibilities of the OAS General Assembly is “[t]o strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized
agencies.”136 Although the OAS predates the U.N.,137 its charter
recognizes the authority of the U.N. and relies upon the recognition and protection provided by the U.N. 138
A party’s membership to the U.N. is conditioned upon its acceptance and execution of the various binding U.N. agreements.139 However, there are significant obstacles to enforcing
a commitment of such large proportions. For one, smaller organizations, such as the OAS, are typically more effective in
addressing the needs of their constituent member nations.140
134. All members of the OAS have supported Ecuador’s decision to grant
Assange asylum, except for the United States and Canada. Jason Reed, Latin
America, Caribbean Unite to Support Ecuador over Assange, REUTERS (Aug.
22, 2012), available at http://rt.com/news/oas-support-ecuador-assange-529/.
135. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133,
art. 1 (“Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a
regional agency.”); id. art. 140 (“None of the provisions of this Charter shall
be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States
under the Charter of the United Nations.”).
136. Id. art. 54(c).
137. Although the origins of the OAS may date back to 1889, the U.N.
Charter was signed three years before the OAS signed their charter. Who We
Are, supra note 133; U.N. Charter, opened for signature June 26, 1945; Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133 (signed in Bogotá,
Colombia in 1948).
138. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 133,
art. 1 (“The Organization of American States has no powers other than those
expressly conferred upon it by this Charter . . . .”); id. art. 131.
139. See U.N. Charter art. 2 (discussing the obligations of members to “act
in accordance with the following Principles”); id. arts. 5–6 (detailing the penalties for member states that do not comply with the principles outlined in
Article 2).
140. Regional organizations are better equipped to address the concerns of
their member states. The effectiveness of such organizations is contingent
upon smaller membership, specifically tailored purposes, and a larger voice
for each of its members. See Johannes F. Linn & Oksana Pidufala, The Experience with Regional Economic Cooperation Organizations: Lessons for Central Asia 6 (Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 4,
2000),
available
at
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For this reason, the U.N may find that adherence to the principles espoused by various U.N. instruments is lacking on issues
where a regional organization provides exceptional support.141
Although the U.N. encourages such regional agreements,142 a
hierarchy amongst the numerous U.N. treaties naturally
emerges in relation to these regional agreements depending on
various factors, including the stability of the government, the
system of government in place, and the level of discretion allowed for interpretation of the U.N. treaties.143
Ecuador has attempted to manipulate its dual membership in
the OAS and the U.N. by arguing that diplomatic asylum is
supported by an OAS regional treaty, as well as by U.N. treaties that have protected human rights for many years.144 Although the validity of diplomatic asylum is reasonably questioned, the U.N. treaties Ecuador references in the dispute are
not easily dismissed.145 Assange presents an ideal opportunity
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/carec%20int
egration%20linn/10_carec_integration_linn.pdf. Implicit amongst these regional organizations is a willingness to address issues that would otherwise
not be addressed by larger international organizations. Id. at 4.
141. Ecuador’s relationship with the OAS and other Latin American nations, as demonstrated by its ratification of the Convention on Diplomatic
Asylum, is emblematic of this concern.
142. See U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations.”).
143. See generally U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7015th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.7015 (Aug. 6, 2013) (discussing how “different perspectives” resulting
from diverse membership pose challenges to cooperation between the U.N.,
regional, and subregional organizations in peacefully resolving disputes).
144. Although Ecuador cites various pieces of international law, the primary basis for its hardline stance is the existence of diplomatic asylum as customary law in Latin America, as established by the Convention on Diplomatic
Asylum and the Haya de la Torre decision. See supra note 12 and text accompanying note 93.
145. Given the lack of precedent of taking over “the sovereign territory of
another country,” the U.K.’s threat to invade the Ecuadorean embassy and
thus violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was seen by
many as a “huge mistake.” ‘UK Made a Huge Mistake Threatening Ecuador’—
Analyst, RT (Aug. 17, 2012), http://rt.com/news/uk-ecuador-threat-mistake-
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for the U.N. to resolve the ambiguities surrounding diplomatic
asylum that should have been addressed many years ago. 146
The popularity of Julian Assange, the foreign-relations implications of the issue, and the unlikelihood of an amicable resolution to the conflict demonstrate the need for a recognized international body to take a leadership role to develop a uniform
international standard for diplomatic asylum.
III. WHY ASSANGE PRESENTS AN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO END
THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM
A. The International Court of Justice is Best Qualified to Hear
the Dispute
In order to maintain their preeminence, it is important for
the ICJ to demonstrate that it is in control and continues to act
in the best interests of the international community.147 The ICJ
is empowered by judicial authority that extends beyond that of
any other international court.148 Since membership to the ICJ
assange-894/. This threat likely portrayed Ecuador’s position in a more favorable light to the international community by demonstrating that attempts to
negotiate in good faith were met with aggressive behavior from the U.K. and
Sweden. Id.
146. Several notable steps could have been taken before the U.N. SecretaryGeneral report that could have curbed the use of diplomatic asylum in such a
manner that future conflict would have been avoided. One example of such a
step is placing certain limits on U.N. membership. See, e.g., supra note 125
(discussing the development of diplomatic asylum in Latin America in the
years leading up to the U.N. Report on Diplomatic Asylum).
147. Along with its indisputable international nexus, the Assange dispute is
also unique in that it implicates each of the purposes stated for the U.N.’s
existence. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (establishing the four broad purposes of the
U.N.: maintaining peace and international security; developing friendly relations; achieving international cooperation; and harmonizing of actions, all of
which are implicated by the Assange dispute).
148. This can be implied from the fact that “[a]ll members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,” as well as from the broad discretion the ICJ is permitted to exercise as
part of its role. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1; ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art.
36(2) (the Court has authority to rule on “all legal disputes concerning: a. the
interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which . . . would constitute a breach of an international obligation; [and] d. the . . . reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation”).
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is exclusive, and both Ecuador and the U.K. are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice by virtue of their membership in the U.N.,149 the Court should take
advantage of an opportunity to resolve a dispute between two
parties that are bound to its rulings.
An essential aspect of the ICJ’s involvement in the Assange
dispute is whether either Ecuador or the U.K., each of which
stands to lose a great deal if they do not prevail, is willing to
allow the ICJ to intervene.150 Although Ecuador’s controversial
position has already placed its international reputation at
risk—at least amongst Sweden, the U.K., and the United
States—an adverse ruling by the ICJ would seemingly bring an
end to a situation that Ecuador is content to allow resolve itself.151 However, the leverage that the U.K. has in the negotiations as a result of their geographical and geopolitical advantages over Ecuador would be at risk if the ICJ were to make
an adverse determination.
Although the outcome will primarily impact Assange’s future,
the ramifications of the case also extend to the various pieces of
international law that will be affected by a definitive ruling on
diplomatic asylum.152 The ICJ’s role as the U.N.’s judicial organ
illustrates that this authority must be exercised in the context
of the entire U.N. organization.153 The fact that the ICJ was
established by the U.N. Charter and owes its existence to the
very document it has been entrusted to protect demonstrates
that an ICJ determination should seek to reach a fair determination, while still promoting the stated purposes of the U.N.154
149. See U.N. Charter art. 93.
150. Prevailing thoughts on diplomatic asylum support the belief that Ecuador would be the underdog in a formal legal proceeding. See Julian Ku,
Ecuador Has Got to Be Bluffing About Its ICJ Case for Assange, OPINIO JURIS
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/24/ecuador-has-got-to-bebluffing-about-its-icj-case-for-assange/ (stating that Ecuador’s potential claim
to the ICJ is so preposterous as to “be blown out of the water by the ICJ”).
151. See Harding, supra note 130.
152. See generally supra note 29 (five of the sixteen legal instruments cited
by Ecuador as supporting their position were either U.N. documents or were
instruments that required U.N. enforcement).
153. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
154. Even though the statute does not specifically provide that the ICJ
should consider principles espoused by the U.N., the structure and compe-
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If the ICJ is requested to hear155 the Assange case, the proceeding will provide an opportunity for the ICJ to revisit its inconclusive ruling in Haya de la Torre and establish definitive
guidelines as to the availability of diplomatic asylum within
customary international law. 156 Since the enactment of the
OAS Treaty on Diplomatic Asylum, there has not been a definitive ruling by a recognized international body on the availability of diplomatic asylum.157 As a result, an inevitable conflict
has developed over the last fifty years, where the practice of
diplomatic asylum has been allowed to flourish in certain areas, and thus become regional custom, while it has fallen into
disuse in other regions. 158 As the result of numerous highprofile disputes that highlight the inconsistent law in this field,
the ICJ’s failure to institute a universal standard for diplomattence of the Court make it difficult to imagine a case in which the Court is
not at least encouraged to take into account such concerns. See generally ICJ
Statute, supra note 70 (setting forth the Court’s organization, competence,
procedure, advisory opinions, and amendments).
155. The ICJ cannot hear a dispute “of its own motion” and can only review
a case when a nation requests them to do so. See Frequently Asked Questions,
INT’L
COURT
OF
JUSTICE
(ICJ),
http://www.icjcij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). While
Ecuador has threatened to pursue such an appeal, there is no evidence that
either party has requested that the ICJ resolve the dispute. Ecuador May
File Appeal to ICJ If UK Refuses Assange Safe Passage, supra note 74. Although it is possible that the Court would be asked to give an advisory opinion
under Article 65, the Assange dispute is more aptly described as a legal dispute between Ecuador and the U.K. than a legal question to be determined
without the two parties’ involvement. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 65.
156. See generally Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 266–89 (Nov. 20)
(stating that diplomatic asylum was not protected by international law, but it
may exist as customary law if accepted by all parties involved); Haya de la
Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 82 (June 13) (where the Court
acknowledged that even though “asylum must cease . . . the Government of
Colombia [was] under no obligation to bring this about by surrendering the
refugee to the Peruvian authorities”).
157. See Kurbalija, supra note 67 (indicating that the issue of diplomatic
asylum has not been addressed since the Haya de la Torre decision).
158. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (the seven instances over a period of forty-one years when diplomatic asylum was granted
were “purely illustrative” of the “[m]any other examples . . . mentioned in the
records in the asylum case and in various publications.”); Asylum, 1950 I.C.J.
at 277 (the “Colombian Government has referred to a large number of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was in fact granted and respected”).
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ic asylum in the Haya de la Torre decision can no longer be ignored.159
The urgent nature of the Assange dispute lends itself to review by the ICJ, which should have the opportunity to review
both parties’ arguments before the situation becomes untenable, which may come either as the result of Assange’s declining
health or from the mounting adverse implications for foreign
relations.160 The numerous diplomatic missions in foreign countries are undoubtedly affected by the legitimacy of the action
taken by Ecuador. In particular, these diplomatic missions
have a compelling interest in a definitive ruling on whether
diplomatic asylum occupies a role within customary international law.161 The ICJ’s inconclusive resolution to Haya de la
159. While the Haya de la Torre decision was binding only on Colombia and
Peru, the ICJ should have been aware that its decision would extend beyond
the immediate parties. See ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 59 (“The decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case.”); id. art. 36(2) (establishing the jurisdiction of the Court
in most international matters); id. art. 38(1) (listing factors that should be
considered by the ICJ when making their determination, which include international custom and “the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations”).
160. Ecuador has had some concerns about Assange’s health, and the U.K.
has vowed not to prevent Assange from receiving medical care if it becomes
necessary. Julian Assange ‘Has Lung Infection,’ BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20537157. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the U.N. will continue to allow Assange to make public attacks on the United States—as he has done via satellite to the U.N.—
without some type of intervention, especially after a U.N. report in March
2012 indicated that Wikileaks ally Bradley Manning “may have been treated
inhumanely.” See Ashley Fantz, Assange Speaks via Satellite from London,
Calls
for
End
to
‘Persecution,’
CNN
(Sept.
27,
2012),
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/26/world/assange-un-address/index.html.
161. Resolution of this case would have a significant impact on international relations. On one hand, nations will likely have some guidance as to
whether diplomatic asylum is a recognized extension of political asylum within international law. On the other hand, “[m]ost countries are fiercely protective of their embassies” and have a vested interest in the level of protection
extended to their embassies under the right of diplomatic asylum. Timothy
McDonald, Assange Case Could Have Wider Impact on Diplomacy, ABC (Aug.
16, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3569084.htm. At
the very least, most observers agree that the bar to revoking such diplomatic
immunity is extremely high, considering both the context and the legislation
in place. Id.
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Torre can no longer be seen as a viable option since neither
party in the present dispute has shown signs of conceding.162
The ICJ should take responsibility for mitigating an international crisis of indeterminate proportions by redefining customary international law to address diplomatic asylum, while
also addressing the conflicting pieces of international law that
have formed the basis for the arguments on both sides of the
dispute.163
B. A New Standard Must Provide Clear Guidelines in Order to
Ensure Cooperation and Prevent Confusion
1. Ambiguous Language Has Doomed Application of Diplomatic
Asylum on an International Scale
In order to ensure the attention to detail that creating a definitive standard requires, the ICJ must undertake a multistep process in presenting a solution to the question of diplomatic asylum. The Court must first develop a new standard for
diplomatic asylum that incorporates precise language as to how
diplomatic asylum will be analyzed in the context of customary
international law. A broad rule addressing international human rights, such as the one established by the ICJ in the Asylum Case, is inappropriate in that it exhibits significant deference to principles of sovereignty. 164 Further, such sovereign
principles are likely to be closely aligned to regional beliefs.165

162. Fittingly, South American ministers encouraged the parties to continue the negotiation process despite voicing public support for Ecuador. See
supra note 129.
163. See generally supra note 29 (listing the numerous legal instruments
cited by Ecuador in support of its decision to grant Assange diplomatic asylum); note 31 (illustrating the “conflicting viewpoints” between Ecuador and
the U.K. regarding the countries’ international obligations).
164. The consequence of a deferential resolution may be perceived as the
Court’s acquiescence to subsequent events in the regions that are affected,
such as the events that transpired after the Haya de la Torre cases. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing the history
and growth of diplomatic asylum, most notably in Latin America).
165. See supra note 139 (stating that regional organizations are specifically
designed to address issues that would otherwise go unresolved in the larger
international community).
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While regional customs and sovereign principles are important in determining the context in which a dispute arises,
the function of an international dispute resolution body is to
provide a solution “in accordance with international law.” 166
Thus, even when a regional dispute such as Haya de la Torre
comes before the ICJ, the ICJ has broad discretion to determine what canons of international law apply.167 Since the U.N.
Charter and international treaties merely provide guidelines
for member states, and not a binding body of law, the ICJ is
entrusted to interpret ambiguous international standards for
disputes that often result from a basic lack of conformity
amongst different legal systems.168
The ICJ’s ruling in Asylum Case was notably lacking in its effort to define absolute terms that would bind the parties to customary international law. The Court’s broad statement that
“asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice”169 provided an opportunity for nations to adopt their own interpretations on when this would be implicated.170 The custom that resulted from the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum ap166. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 38(1).
167. Within its broad responsibility “to decide in accordance with international law,” the ICJ is to apply,
a. international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; [and] d. . . . judicial decisions and the
teachings . . . of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Id.
168. The International Criminal Court is a reflection of an attempt to codify
certain aspects of criminal law in international law, although the court’s efforts up to this point have concentrated on crimes committed on a large scale.
For instance, it has attempted to “reach[] a consensus on definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” About the Court, INT’L CRIM.
CT., http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Jan.
19, 2013).
169. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 284 (Nov. 20).
170. The Court’s attempt to qualify this term, by stating that “[t]he safety
which arises out of asylum cannot be construed as a protection against the
regular application of the laws and against the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals[,]” id., missed the mark by failing to limit the subjectivity of
the term “justice.”
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pears to comport with the ICJ’s general advice to observe customary law and undertake good faith efforts to come to a negotiated settlement.171 Although the Haya de la Torre model has
survived for more than fifty years, it is apparent that a new
standard must emerge that better takes into account globalization and the importance of uniformity regarding fundamental
human rights.
The Asylum Case standard initially failed in its effort to specify whether different standards would apply to political asylum
and diplomatic asylum. 172 Specific conditions relating to the
“urgency” and duration of diplomatic asylum must not only define asylum in general terms, but also address whether political asylum and diplomatic asylum will be treated differently in
the future.173 The urgency of a case is dependent on numerous
factors and thus almost entirely reliant on a subjective determination by the nation granting asylum.174 A modern determination should therefore seek to establish an objective standard
that is not subject to the fanciful interpretations that accompany illusive terms such as “reasonable fear of political persecution.”
2. A Clearly Defined Role for Diplomatic Asylum
In defining the standard for diplomatic asylum, the ICJ
should proceed with various goals in mind. First, the Court
171. See Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, art. 9 (“[t]he
official furnishing asylum shall take into account the information furnished
to him by the territorial government in forming his judgment as to the nature
of the offense or the existence of related common crimes”). Although the precise usage patterns amongst OAS members remain unknown, the absence of
any recent dispute that has garnered international attention appears to indicate that the concept is widely accepted and rarely challenged, or at least
resolved amicably between the interested nations.
172. The Court itself acknowledged that the two parties’ arguments “reveal[ed] a confusion between territorial asylum (extradition), on the one
hand, and diplomatic asylum, on the other.” Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 274.
173. From the Havana Convention, the ICJ held that diplomatic asylum
“can be granted only to political offenders who are not accused or condemned
for common crimes and only in urgent cases and for the time strictly indispensable for the safety of the refugee.” Id. at 278.
174. In determining that Haya de la Torre’s case was not of an “urgent
character,” the Court did not establish a helpful standard for future use, but
implied that the determination was almost entirely contextual. Id. at 283–87.
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should firmly establish the scope of diplomatic asylum within
international human rights law.175 In an effort to monitor its
use, the ICJ should recognize diplomatic asylum as a subset of
political asylum within customary international law.176 A significant reason behind the international failure to regulate diplomatic asylum is the divergent paths that were taken after
Asylum Case.177 By broadening the applicability of diplomatic
asylum law, the ICJ would thereby eliminate disputes about
what constitutes “international custom,” defined by the Court
“as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 178 This
would preclude the Court from engaging in fact-intensive investigations of past use, such as whether diplomatic asylum is
a part of U.S. custom as a result of its sporadic but infamous
use of the right over the past century.179 The expanded scope of
175. Within pieces of recognized international law, the formal international
stance on the incident is that diplomatic asylum is not officially recognized by
most countries. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 155 (arguing that diplomatic asylum “had not been accepted by the majority of European States, and by the United Kingdom Government in particular”). However this dispute, along with the prevalence of diplomatic asylum in Latin
America, and notable instances of use by the United States over the past fifty
years, has certainly raised questions as to how nations view diplomatic asylum unofficially. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 28 (listing three cases where
the United States granted asylum to those who sought refuge in its diplomatic missions).
176. In retaining the right to differentiate between political and diplomatic
asylum, the ICJ should determine that the broad protection offered by Article
14 of the UDHR only applies in cases of political asylum, so as to not restrict
human rights any more than necessary. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” See UDHR, supra note 11.
177. See generally Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10 (discussing
how a system had developed amongst Latin American countries whereby ad
hoc administration of diplomatic asylum had become sufficiently prominent
so as to become an important part of regional human rights law, while the
right had all but ceased to be granted in all other parts of the world).
178. ICJ Statute, supra note 70, art. 38(1)(b). The Haya de la Torre case
demonstrates that even evidence of past practice does not necessarily signify
the existence of custom in a specific country. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (holding that the evidence failed to demonstrate that
the right of diplomatic asylum existed as custom in Colombia).
179. See Austermuhle, supra note 100 (recalling the infamous U.S. diplomatic asylum case involving József Mindszenty); Greene, supra note 28 (citing to an article discussing key international precedents involving diplomatic
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diplomatic asylum would also result in each U.N. member being bound by the same terms, so as to enable each nation to tailor its other international responsibilities around a uniform
principle of diplomatic asylum.
Having addressed to whom diplomatic asylum will apply, the
Court should then move on to its most important role: establishing the requisite conditions for when diplomatic asylum
may be granted. As it currently stands, the OAS Convention on
Diplomatic Asylum provides that nations have wide discretion
in situations where diplomatic asylum is available.180 The only
qualification to this unfettered discretion appears to be that
there must be a good faith effort by a nation to “take into account the information furnished to [it] by the territorial government in forming [its] judgment as to the nature of the offence or the existence of related common crimes.”181 The expansive language of the UDHR provides no further instruction as
to when asylum should be granted.182 The absence of a tem-

asylum). In February 2012, the United States notably chose not to grant diplomatic asylum to Wang Lijun. Wang Lijun ended the rein of Chongqing
Communist Party Chief, Bo Xilai, due in large part to “his role in a widening
political scandal inside China.” Jay Solomon & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Saw Top
Cop as Risky Asylum Candidate, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303459004577362360212353
368.html.
180. Article IV of the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum provides that
“[i]t shall rest with the State granting asylum to determine the nature of the
offense or the motives for the persecution.” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, art. 4.
181. Id. art. 9. In this regard, however, the Dominican Republic did make a
reservation to the applicability of diplomatic asylum in certain situations,
specifically “to any controversies that may arise between the territorial State
and the State granting asylum, that refer specifically to the absence of a serious situation or the non-existence of a true act of persecution against the
asylee by the local authorities.” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General
Information, supra note 12.
182. Article 14 provides only that “everyone has the right to seek and to
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 11. Article II of the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum additionally provides that “[e]very State has the right to grant asylum; but it is not obligated to do so or to state its reasons for refusing it.”
Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12, art. 2. However, Guatemala and Uruguay both made reservations to this provision, arguing that states
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poral element may have symbolized an effort to allow countries
to make subjective determinations in constantly evolving political times.183
A specific standard for when diplomatic asylum applies
should first seek to place a time limit on the duration of a grant
of diplomatic asylum. The lack of a fixed duration has proven
problematic for both OAS nations and the United States. 184
Although the United States does not depart from its stated policy against diplomatic asylum, the instances in which the United States has granted diplomatic asylum have signaled its willingness to allow asylees to remain in U.S. missions for long periods of time.185 While cooperation amongst OAS nations has
generally facilitated this process, Latin America has encountered difficulties with regard to extended grants of diplomatic
asylum.186
An established duration would reflect a compromise between
the complete elimination of diplomatic asylum and the OAS’
did have an affirmative obligation to grant asylum in certain circumstances.
Convention on Diplomatic Asylum: General Information, supra note 12.
183. The decision to institute such expansive language may similarly reflect
an effort to allow the U.N. flexibility to determine the validity of individual
asylum cases, rather than risk the possibility of individual nations infringing
on human rights. This possibility is supported by the creation of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was established in 1950 to
“lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee
problems
worldwide.”
About
Us,
UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
184. See generally Angela Rossitto, Diplomatic Asylum in the United States
and Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 13 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 118–
27, 130–34 (1987) (providing “analysis of the limited United States practice of
granting asylum” and of “controversial events . . . that demonstrate the ways
in which Latin America’s rather liberal policy has proven to be problematic”).
185. See id. at 118–20. Although the Soviets did not appreciate that the
United States had granted diplomatic asylum to Mindszenty, the United
States was similarly upset that the ordeal lasted fifteen years. Id. Seven Russian Pentecostal dissidents remained in the U.S. embassy in Russia for more
than three years. Id. at 120–21.
186. See id. at 130–31. Safe-conducts were provided to military prisoners
after approximately five months in the Peruvian embassy in Caracas, Venezuela. Id. Haya de la Torre remained in the Colombian embassy in Lima from
1949 to 1954, before he was permitted to leave. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
257669/Victor-Raul-Haya-de-la-Torre (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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standard “for the time strictly indispensable for the safety of
the refugee.”187 Such broad language places exclusive reliance
on a negotiated solution, since it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the “safety of a refugee” is ensured without an
amicable resolution between parties.188 Thus, a short duration
permits both parties sufficient time to engage in good faith efforts to reach a negotiated solution before the parties become
subject to consequences that accompany a failure to reach a
mutually agreed upon resolution.189
Conflicts without an established date for resolution also raise
the important question of how diplomatic asylum should be
terminated if no amicable resolution is reached between the
parties. This is the precise issue that the ICJ considered in its
Haya de la Torre judgment when the ICJ refused to compel
Haya de la Torre’s surrender to Peru because such an action
would reward Peru with custody of Haya de la Torre.190 The
consequences of failing to come to an agreement prior to the
expiration of the six-month duration of asylum that should be
implemented in all future cases of diplomatic asylum should
have repercussions that both parties will acknowledge as legitimate, but only to the extent that it encourages good faith negotiation.191
187. Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 278 (Nov. 20). This language
was later changed to “the period of time strictly necessary for the asylee to
depart from the country with the guarantees granted by the Government of
the territorial state . . . .” Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 12,
art. 5.
188. Such reliance lends credence to Ecuador’s refusal to budge on its
stance, as the de facto position permits them to keep Assange indefinitely.
See supra note 130 (stating Ecuador’s willingness to allow Assange to remain
in its embassy for “two centuries” if necessary).
189. While a fixed duration would not necessarily encourage an expeditious
result, it would give both parties ample opportunity to explore various avenues for a settlement. It also shows that diplomatic asylum cases are often
illustrative of larger political differences that take time to resolve.
190. Haya de la Torre Case (Colom./Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 81–82 (June 13).
The court inexplicably provided no further guidance as to how Haya de la
Torre’s asylum should be terminated, alleging that such advice would require
the Court to “depart from its judicial function.” Id. at 83.
191. As it currently stands, whether a party is willing to make a good faith
effort in negotiation is affected by the strength of its bargaining position. See
supra note 185 (arguing that Ecuador has the superior bargaining position at
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The ICJ should thus mandate that all unresolved disputes be
referred to an independent international body that would definitively rule on the validity of a diplomatic asylum case. Since
the primary purpose of such an international body would be to
encourage a negotiated resolution and discourage the pursuit of
independent judicial review, this review body would ideally be
the creation of an organization that deals with human rights
cases, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”).192 For parties that do not want to face the
uncertainty that accompanies a judicial proceeding, a negotiated settlement within the fixed time period provides the only
alternative.
When the independent tribunal is called upon to resolve a
diplomatic asylum dispute, it is important that a specific legal
standard is applied to the individuals that have been granted
asylum. First, the tribunal should defer to the penal system in
the nation bringing the charges in determining whether the
aslyee is sought for a “common crime.”193 The tribunal’s interpretation of this term provides a safeguard to ensure that poor
foreign relations between nations will not impact whether specific misconduct is classified as a “common crime.” Next, the
tribunal should make the conclusive determination whether
the asylee faces a “reasonable fear of political persecution.” It is
only at this point that the tribunal will determine which of two
courses of action is appropriate: surrender the party to the nation seeking prosecution, or recognize the party’s permanent
political asylee status and allow for safe passage into the nation that has granted diplomatic asylum.194
this point because the de facto position is that Assange remains in its embassy, and history has demonstrated that such standoffs can last for long periods
of time).
192. Judicial review led by the UNHCR would be ideal, not only for
UNHCR’s history of dealing with asylum and refugees, but also because its
authority is granted by the U.N. About Us, supra note 180.
193. See Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 278 (Nov. 20) (holding that,
under the Havana Convention, diplomatic asylum “can be granted only to
political offenders who are not accused or condemned for common crimes . .
.”).
194. The importance of the only two potential outcomes is that both outcomes present a natural conclusion to the temporary status of diplomatic asylum, which should be the primary goal.
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While this proposed proceeding is assuredly a fact-intensive
determination that rests upon the subjective determination of a
third party, it only comes at the end of a process that has presented numerous opportunities for both sides to resolve the
dispute amicably without judicial interference. Further, the
subjective determination is entrusted to a judicial body intrinsically qualified to make determinations on sensitive human
rights matters in an efficient manner that reflects the magnitude of the proceedings.195 A judicial body that has adhered to
the process outlined above will offer substantial clarity to a
system that has led some to question whether diplomatic asylum is recognized by international law.
CONCLUSION
Julian Assange’s stay in the Ecuadorean embassy has provided the international community an opportunity to address
an area of law that has needed clarification since it was first
recognized more than sixty years ago.196 As the role of asylum
law has changed in conjunction with increased international
interest in human rights, the uncertainty surrounding the
right of diplomatic asylum has been largely disregarded in favor of guaranteeing widespread protection from persecution.197
The result has been nearly unfettered limits to a principle that
has grown within the right of political asylum, providing pro195. The ability to make such determinations in a competent manner is
perhaps the most important role of this independent tribunal, since such expertise has a significant impact on the parties’ willingness to resolve their
dispute in front of this judicial body.
196. Although the right of asylum draws aspects from various pieces of law,
the Asylum Case and Haya de la Torre decisions and the OAS Convention on
Diplomatic Asylum provide the necessary foundation for diplomatic asylum
law. See supra notes 12 (stating that the OAS Convention on Diplomatic Asylum provides the framework for how diplomatic asylum will be administered
amongst parties to the treaty), 69 (Asylum Case addressed whether diplomatic asylum was recognized by international law, while the Haya de la Torre
case centered upon whether Colombia was compelled to surrender Haya de la
Torre to the Peruvian government).
197. This increased interest in human rights is perhaps best illustrated by
the history of the UNHCR. This organization has grown from thirty-four staff
members in 1954, to more than 7,000 members in 2012, and has been awarded two Nobel Peace Prizes, most recently in 1981 for “worldwide assistance
[of] refugees.” About Us, supra note 180.

486

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

tection within diplomatic premises to individuals fleeing persecution by sovereign nations.
While the availability of political asylum is an important tool
in the protection of human rights on a global scale, definitive
limits must be placed on a tool with such expansive reach. Geopolitical differences have allowed definitions of asylum to diverge, resulting in the growth of diplomatic asylum in Latin
America.198 Notably, this unprecedented growth has seemingly
coincided with an increased lack of acceptance of diplomatic
asylum amongst most other countries. The Assange dispute
has demonstrated that separate treatment for political refugees
based on their geographic location can result in contentious
disputes that extend beyond the question of human rights. As
the supreme international organization, the U.N. should not
allow the Assange dispute to dissipate before definitively
providing a binding international standard on the permissibility of the concept of diplomatic asylum. Failure to take such
decisive action may have drastic consequences for the future,
when additional disputes over the right of diplomatic asylum
under an imprecise standard could have a disastrous effect on
foreign relations.
Thomas Lavander*

198. See Question of Diplomatic Asylum, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (noting famous
instances where diplomatic asylum had been granted in Latin America from
1850 to 1891).
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